A supremum-of-quadratics representation for convex barrier-type constraints is developed and applied within the context of a class of continuous time state constrained linear regulator problems. Using this representation, it is shown that a linear regulator problem subjected to such a convex barrier-type constraint can be equivalently formulated as an unconstrained two-player linear quadratic game. By demonstrating equivalence of the upper and lower values of this game, state feedback characterizations for the optimal policies of both players are developed. These characterizations are subsequently illustrated by example.
Introduction
The study of unconstrained continuous time linear quadratic regulator (LQR) problems has provided the foundation of numerous advances in systems theory over many decades, including in optimal control [1] , and in the development of practical receding horizon / model predictive control strategies [2] . The value function that attends their formulation as an optimal control problem is guaranteed to be finite everywhere on sufficiently short time horizons, and is quadratic in the initial state, see for example [1, 3] . Indeed, it is well known that the Hessian of the value function is characterized in terms of the unique solution of a corresponding final value problem defined by a differential Riccati equation (DRE) subject to a terminal condition set by the Hessian of the terminal payoff. Standard tools exist for the efficient solution of DREs, and thus continuous time LQR problems.
The introduction of state constraints into LQR problems fundamentally impacts their solvability. Indeed, the nonlinearity inherent in such a constraint naturally destroys the quadratic structure that underpins the solvability of LQR problems via DREs. Instead, the value functions involved are inherently non-quadratic, and satisfy a more general non-stationary Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) partial differential equation (PDE). It is well-known that HJB PDEs are difficult to solve for nonlinear regulator problems, and that computational strategies that attend their solution suffer from a curse-of-dimensionality [4] . These difficulties limit the imposition of state constraints in continuous time LQR problems.
In this paper, implementation of a simple state constraint in an otherwise standard finite dimensional continuous time LQR problem is considered. Specifically, in addition to the standard linear open-loop dynamics and quadratic costs, a general convex barrier function is introduced with a view to constraining the state to a ball in the state space. By employing what is effectively a convex relaxation, an alternative solution strategy for such problems is explored via the study of a related unconstrained two-player game. Fundamental to this exploration is the development of an exact sup(remum)-of-quadratics representation for the introduced convex barrier function. In this representation, the associated non-quadratic state penalty is expressed as the supremum of a parameterized family of quadratic penalties. The parameter identifying elements of this family is a single unbounded real variable that is related to the Hessian of the associated quadratic penalty. Its manipulation ultimately allows a quadratic state penalty to be selected in a state dependent fashion, in lieu of the general convex barrier penalty, as the underlying state trajectory evolves in time. Where necessary, an infinite state penalty corresponding to activation of the state constraint can be levied by allowing this quadratic penalty parameter to tend to infinity. An approximate sup-of-quadratics representation follows by limiting the parameter involved to a bounded interval. This approximation exactly represents the barrier function for states inside a ball, and approximates it by a single quadratic function for states outside that ball. It is parameterized by the upper bound of the interval involved, and converges to the exact sup-of-quadratics representation as this upper interval bound tends to infinity. Examples of the type of sup-of-quadratics representation obtained are illustrated in Figure 1 . Figure 1: Sup-of-quadratics representation for Φ of (6), (93).
Invocation of the exact or approximate sup-of-quadratics representation for the convex barrier function in the state constrained regulator problem of interest yields respectively the same regulator problem, or a convergent approximation to it. Convergence is demonstrated both in terms of the value functions involved, and the behaviour of their optimal state trajectories. It is shown explicitly that the exact representation yields an implementation of the state constraint, with trajectories always confined to the closed ball of interest, and to its interior almost always (a.e. in time). The approximate problem is shown to yield trajectories that converge to this behaviour. Measurable selection subsequently leads to the consideration of corresponding two player games. In these games, the minimizing player corresponds to the usual control, while the maximizing player is an adversary that negotiates an appropriate state penalty, given the current state of the trajectory relative to the state constraint. It is shown that the upper values of the exact and approximate games are equivalent respectively to the exact and approximate regulator problems indicated above, in the same quantitative manner regarding value and constraint satisfaction. The upper and lower values are subsequently shown to be equivalent, see also [5] , which is useful in computation. Consideration of the approximating game lower value yields corresponding state feedback characterizations for the optimal policies of both players. These policies are shown to explicitly depend on the solution of the state dynamics driven by the approximate optimal control, and the solution of an attendant family of DREs. It is demonstrated that solutions of these DREs always exist, and that they encode the actions of the maximizing (state penalty negotiating) player. Convergence of these policies to those of the exact game is guaranteed, so that the optimal control in particular converges to that of the original state constrained regulator problem of interest. An illustrative example is included that evaluates an approximate optimal strategy for both players, given a specific initial plant state and terminal cost. The effect of the state constraint on the optimal control and trajectory is also identified.
A selected collection of immediately relevant prior works that invoke duality in optimal control, and the implementation of constraints in otherwise linear quadratic regulator problems, include [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11] , and (from the authors) [12, 13, 14] . Specifically, [6] develops an approximation scheme for general convex costs, and studies consistency of this approximation, while [7] considers continuous time constrained control in a model predictive control setting, subject to an interiority condition on the feedback policy. One of many related investigations exploiting barrier functions in the implementation of constraints is detailed in [11] , via a discrete time setting. Duality and saddle point properties are explored in a more general setting in [8, 10] , albeit in the restricted case of control constraints. The tools of convex analysis are employed in the general treatment of a closely related class of continuous time problems in [9] that addresses both control and state constraints. Motivated by [5] , a key contribution of the current work relative to [9] concerns the sup-of-quadratics representation developed for the extended real barrier functions involved, and their invocation in studying the optimal control problem via an unconstrained game. Preliminary efforts [12, 13, 14] (by the authors) document the genesis of this contribution, with log-barrier functions considered initially, and more general convex barrier functions considered subsequently. The more recent work [14] has demonstrated how this approach can be generalized to more general convex state constraints, in the company of time-varying dynamics. For brevity, those details are not included here.
In terms of organization, the state constrained linear regulator problem of interest is posed in Section 2, along with the class of convex barrier functions involved. This is followed in Section 3 by development of the exact and approximate sup-of-quadratics representations for these convex barrier functions, and the introduction of the approximate regulator problem. Existence and uniqueness of optimal trajectories for the exact and approximate regulator problems are considered in Section 4, along with their behaviour relative to the state constraint of interest. Exact and approximate two player games are formulated in Section 5, and their respective equivalences with the exact and approximate regulator problems is demonstrated. A further equivalence of the upper and lower values is demonstrated in each case. This in turn motivates characterization of the optimal policies involved via solution of a two-point boundary value problem defined in terms of a DRE. This characterization is subsequently illustrated by example of Section 6. The paper concludes with some minor summarizing remarks in Section 7. An appendix is included for technicalities that might otherwise interrupt the developments described.
Throughout, R, N, Z denote the reals, natural numbers, and integers, while R ≥0 , R >0 , and R denote the non-negative, positive, and extended reals respectively, with the latter defined by R .
and R >a . = (a, ∞) for any a ∈ R. An n-dimensional Euclidean space is denoted by R n . The space of matrices mapping R m to R n is denoted by R n×m . The subset of positive semidefinite symmetric matrices in R n×n is denoted by Σ n . The Euclidean and induced matrix norms are denoted by | · | and · respectively. Otherwise, the norm on a Banach space U is denoted by · U , or simply · if the space is contextually apparent. Open and closed balls of radius r ∈ R ≥0 in U are denoted respectively by B U (0; r) and B U [0; r] respectively. Weak convergence of a sequence {u k } k∈N ⊂ U to someū ∈ U is denoted by u k ⇀ū (as k → ∞). The product space U × · · · × U of k ∈ N instances of U is denoted by U k . The space of bounded linear operators between Banach spaces U and V is denoted by L(U ; V ). The respective spaces of continuous and k-times continuously differentiable functions mapping U to V are denoted by C(U ; V ) and C k (U ; V ) for k ∈ N ∪ {∞}. Differentiability at a closed left or right end-point of an interval is interpreted throughout to mean right-or left-differentiability respectively. The space of (Lebesgue) square integrable mappings from [0, t] ⊂ R ≥0 to U is denoted by L 2 ([0, t]; U ). Unless otherwise specified, C([0, t]; U ) is equipped with the sup norm, i.e. F .
The following concern a function f : U → R on Banach space U :
State constrained linear regulator problem
Interest is restricted to optimal control problems defined on a finite time horizon t ∈ R ≥0 , with respect to linear dynamics and a convex barrier state constraint. The value function W t : R n → R + involved is defined by
for all x ∈ R n , in which
is the space of open loop controls, andJ t is a cost function defined with respect to the integrated running costsĪ t and I κ t , κ ∈ R >0 , and a terminal cost Ψ. In particular,J t ,Ī t :
.
for all x ∈ R n , u ∈ U [0, t], in which K ∈ R and P t ∈ Σ n are a priori fixed, and Φ is an extended real valued barrier function to be specified below. The map s → ξ s ∈ R n , s ∈ [0, t], describes the unique trajectory of a linear dynamical system corresponding to an initial state x ∈ R n and input u ∈ U [0, t], given explicitly via a map χ : R n × U [0, t] → R n , where
for all s ∈ [0, t], given A ∈ R n×n , B ∈ R n×m , B = 0. The barrier function Φ : R → R + is defined by
for fixed b ∈ R >0 , in which φ : [0, b 2 ) → R satisfies the following properties:
φ is twice continuously differentiable, with φ ′′ strictly positive; (ii) lim ρ↑b 2 φ(ρ) = ∞, and φ ′ (0) ≥ −K; (iii) φ is strictly convex; (iv) φ ′ is strictly increasing, and
Note in particular that (iii)-(v) follow as a consequence of (i)- (ii) , see for example [16, Theorem 2.13, p.46]. As a consequence, φ has a well-defined convex dual a :
for all β ∈ R ≥φ ′ (0) , that satisfies a variety of properties, including invertibility, etc, see Lemma A.1 in Appendix A. It defines a useful change of coordinates in the sup-of-quadratics representation that is developed for barrier Φ in Section 3. Two preliminary lemmas concerning (1), (5) are included prior to commencing this development. Their proofs are standard and are omitted for brevity. (5) for all k ∈ N, the following properties hold: 
3 Barrier representations and an approximate regulator problem
Exact and approximate sup-of-quadratics representations for closed convex barrier functions of the form of Φ of (6) can be established via convex duality [16, 15] . These representations are fundamental to the development of a convergent approximation for the state constrained regulator problem (1), and its subsequent representation via unconstrained linear quadratic games. The development of these representations and the approximate regulator problem follow below.
Exact sup-of-quadratics representation for convex barriers
Lemma 3.1. The barrier function Φ : R → R + of (6) is closed and convex, and there exists a closed and convex function Θ : R → R such that
for all ρ, β ∈ R, with a as per (8) . Furthermore, the optimizersβ * : R → R andρ * : R → R in (10), defined byβ * (ρ) . = arg max β∈R {β ρ − Θ(β)} andρ * (β) . = arg max ρ∈R {β ρ − Φ(ρ)}, are given bŷ
for all β, ρ ∈ R.
Proof. See Appendix B.
This lemma, and a change of coordinates via (8) , yields the sup-of-quadratics representation. (2), (3), and defined by (6) , has the exact sup-of-quadratics representation
for all x ∈ R n , in which a −1 is defined via (8) . Furthermore, the optimizerα
in (12) is defined via φ ′ , a of (7), (8) bŷ
for all x ∈ R n .
Proof. Fix arbitrary x ∈ R n . Recall by Lemma 3.1 that Φ(|x| 2 ) has the representation (10), with the optimizerβ * (|x| 2 ) that achieves the supremum over β ∈ R there defined by (11) . As |x| 2 ∈ R ≥0 , (11) implies by inspection thatβ * (|x| 2 ) ≥ φ ′ (|x| 2 ). Furthermore, by property (iv) of (7),
and a is invertible, see (8) and Lemma A.1. Hence, Φ(|x| 2 ) simplifies from the left-hand equation in (10), via (8) , to Φ(|x| 2 ) = sup β≥φ ′ (0) {β |x| 2 − Θ(β)} = sup β≥a −1 (−φ(0)) {β |x| 2 − a(β)}, which yields (12) . The same change of variable applied toβ * (|x| 2 ) via (11) similarly yields (13).
Remark 3.3. While the barrier map ρ → Φ(ρ) : R → R + of (6) is guaranteed to be convex by Lemma 3.1, the corresponding state space map x → Φ(|x| 2 ) : R n → R + need not be convex. However, Theorem 3.2 implies that x → Φ(|x| 2 ) : R n → R + is uniformly semiconvex [4, 17] . In particular, choosing any η ≥ −2 a −1 (−φ(0)), (12) yields
for all x ∈ R n , in which a −1 (α) +
, as a −1 is strictly increasing by Lemma A.1. The right-hand side of (14) is thus a supremum of convex functions, which is therefore also convex, see [15, p.7] . That is, (14) implies that there exists an η ∈ R such that
is uniformly semiconvex by definition, see [4, 17] .
Approximate sup-of-quadratics representation for convex barriers
An approximation of the sup-of-quadratics representation of Theorem 3.2 can be obtained by restricting the interval over which the supremum is evaluated in the left-hand equation in (10) . To this end,
for all M ∈ R ≥−φ(0) , ρ ∈ R, with φ ′ , a, Θ as per (7), (8), (10), with the range of Φ M to be verified.
Lemma 3.4. The following properties hold: (15) satisfies
for all ρ ∈ R, in which the corresponding maximizer β = β M * : R → R − is given bŷ
, and it is closed and strictly convex on R;
, for all ρ ∈ R, with Φ as per (6);
As per the exact case of Theorem 3.2, application of this lemma along with a change of coordinates defined by (8) admits the required approximate sup-of-quadratics representation.
Theorem 3.5. Given b ∈ R >0 , the following holds:
represented in (15), (16), has the sup-of-quadratics representation
for all x ∈ R n , in which a −1 is as per (8) . Furthermore, the optimizer in (18) iŝ
where φ ′ , a,ρ are as per (7), (8), (15) 
Combining this bound with (22) and (29) yields
, as required to complete the proof in that unbounded case. Alternatively, suppose that {u ǫ k } k∈N is bounded, i.e. there exists
In view of (3), (23), and Corollary 3.6, define a sequence {ν ǫ k } k∈N of maps from [0, t] to R ≥0 , and its candidate limitν ǫ :
there exists an open interval containing |ξ ǫ s | 2 on which Φ is continuous, and
Consequently, combining (31) and (32), and recalling theν ǫ s = ∞ case above, it may be concluded that lim k→∞ [ν ǫ k ] s =ν ǫ s for both theν ǫ s = ∞ and theν ǫ s < ∞ cases. Next, recall by definition (30) and Corollary 3.6, that {ṽ ǫ k } k∈N defines a non-negative sequence of functions in C([0, t]; R). Consequently, every element of this sequence is measurable and non-negative, so that Fatou's lemma yields
Hence, recalling (30), the definitions ofξ ǫ k ,ξ ǫ prior, and (3), (23),
Meanwhile, by weak convergence ofũ
Moreover, continuity of [χ(x, ·)] t by Lemma 2.1 (ii), along with continuity of Ψ t of (4), imply that
Combining (33), (34), (35) via (2), (22) yields
Hence, applying (29) and (36) while recalling that {ũ ǫ k } k∈N ⊂ {u ǫ k } k∈N is a subsequence of the nearoptimal inputs involved, and noting thatū ǫ is suboptimal in the definition (1) of W t (x), yields
As ǫ ∈ R >0 is arbitrary, it follows that W t (x) ≤ W ∞ (x). Recalling (28) and the fact that t ∈ R ≥0 and x ∈ R n are also arbitrary completes the proof of the equality in (27).
Optimal trajectories and constraint satisfaction
Existence and uniqueness of the optimal trajectories in (1), (21) is demonstrated via analysis of the attendant cost functions (2), (23). In particular, these cost functions are shown to be proper, lower semicontinuous, strictly convex, and coercive. These properties are demonstrated to be sufficient for the required existence and uniqueness of the optimal controls involved, and hence the corresponding trajectories. The behaviour of these optimal trajectories relative to the desired state constraint is subsequently determined.
Existence and uniqueness of the optimal controls
In order to demonstrate that the cost functionsJ (2), (23) are proper, convex, and coercive for fixed t ∈ R ≥0 , M ∈ R ≥−φ(0) , x ∈ R n , it is useful to consider the map γ
for all u ∈ U [0, t], in which χ is as per (5). 
Hence, applying Theorem 3.7, and in particular (24), (26),
As u ∈ U [0, t] and {ũ i } i∈N ⊂ U [0, t] are arbitrary, the assertion follows.
(
, and ξ . = χ(x, u) by (5). By (3), (18), (23),
where γ s,α x is as per (37). Recall by Lemma 4.1 that γ 
Lastly, as Ψ of (4) is convex by definition of P t ∈ Σ n , and
[Convexity ofJ t (x, ·)] Recalling the convexity argument immediately above, 
[Coercivity ofJ M t (x, ·)] Recall by Corollary 3.6 that
for all
and note that this is always possible by Theorem 3.7, i.e. (26). Hence, domJ M t (x, ·) = ∅ = domJ t (x, ·). Again recalling (26), along with (39), note also that −∞ < φ(0) (2), (23) are proper for any x ∈ dom W t .
Finally, recalling (39) yields thatJ M t (y, ·) is also proper for any y ∈ dom W M t = R n .
With t ∈ R >0 , existence and uniqueness of the optimal controls in (1), (21) may now be established.
for the respective optimal control problems (1), (21), with
Proof. As the existence and uniqueness arguments for the two optimal controls in (40) are analogous, only the first is included. Fix any t ∈ R >0 , and recall that dom W t = ∅ by Lemma 2.2. Fix any x ∈ dom W t , and recall by Lemma 4.2 thatJ t (x, ·) : U [0, t] → R + is proper, lower semicontinuous, strictly convex, and coercive. Given ℓ ∈ R + , define the level set
AsJ t (x, ·) : U [0, t] → R + is proper and coercive, and (39) holds, there existsû ∈ U [0, t] such that
is finite, i.e. ℓ 0 ∈ R, and Λ ℓ of (41) is guaranteed to be non-empty for all ℓ > ℓ 0 . Moreover, as κ ∈ R >0 , (39) implies that Λ ℓ is bounded for all ℓ > ℓ 0 , with
That is, {u k } k∈N is bounded. As per the proof of Theorem 3.7, this implies the existence of a subsequence {û k } k∈N ⊂ {u k } k∈N and aū
. Define a sequence of maps {ν k } k∈N from [0, t] to R + and its candidate limitν : 
2 t = lim inf k→∞Īt (x,û k ), which, again following the proof of Theorem 3.7, yieldsJ t (x,ū) ≤ lim inf k→∞Jt (x,û k ). Abuse notation by relabelling {ℓ k } k∈N to match the subsequence {û k } k∈N of {u k } k∈N , and note thatû k ∈ Λ ℓ k . Hence,J t (x,ū) ≤ lim inf k→∞Jt (x,û k ) ≤ lim inf k→∞ ℓ k = ℓ 0 . Consequently, by definition of ℓ 0 ,J t (x,ū) = ℓ 0 = inf u∈U [0,t]Jt (x, u), so thatū ∈ arg min u∈U [0,t]Jt (x, u) and the argmin is non-empty. Suppose there exists aũ ∈ arg min u∈U [0,t]Jt (x, u) such thatũ =ū, and defineȗ
Hence, the argmin is a singleton, with {u * } = arg min u∈U [0,t]Jt (x, u), as u * .
=ū =ũ.
Remark 4.4. In the t = 0 special case, note by (3) that I κ t : U [0, t] → R is identically zero, and so is not strictly convex. Consequently, the strict convexity assertion (ii) of Lemma 4.2 fails in that case, and uniqueness of the optimal controls in (1), (21) cannot be established via Theorem 4.3.
Remark 4.5. Given any non-decreasing sequence {M k } k∈N ⊂ R ≥−φ(0) such that lim k→∞ M k = ∞, it may be shown that there exists a subsequence {M j } j∈N ⊂ {M k } k∈N such that the corresponding optimal controls {u
The details follow a similar argument to the proof of Theorem 4.3 above, and are omitted.
Constraint satisfaction
With existence of the optimal controls in (1), (21) guaranteed by Theorem 4.3, the corresponding state trajectories can be examined to determine their compliance with the intended state constraint. To this end, given t ∈ R >0 , x ∈ R n , ǫ ∈ R >0 , define the sets of ǫ-optimal inputs in the definitions (1),
Define the sets of times for which the desired state constraint is violated, as a function of the initial state and control, via a map ∆ t : R n × U → ∪ I⊂[0,t] I, where
for all x ∈ R n , u ∈ U [0, t], in which χ is as per (5).
Theorem 4.6. The following properties concerning the map ∆ t of (45) hold for any t ∈ R >0 :
(i) There exist constants M 1 ∈ R >−φ(0) and η t , λ t , Ξ t ∈ R >0 and non-increasing β :
for all x ∈ R n , in which µ denotes the Lebesgue measure, and U
M,ǫ x
is as per (44);
(ii) Given any x ∈ dom W t , and any ǫ ∈ R >0 ,
in which U ǫ x [0, t] is as per (43); and (iii) Given any x ∈ dom W t , and any strictly increasing sequence {M k } k∈N ⊂ R >−φ(0) , there exist a unique u * ∈ U [0, t] and a unique sequence
, and c, Lemma 3.4 (iii) and (iv) imply that c < inf
Motivated by (48), define β :
for all M > M 1 , and note that it is non-increasing by Lemma 3.4 (iii). Furthermore, (18) and Lemma A.2 imply that lim
is as per (99). Hence, by inspection of (49), lim M →∞ β(M ) = 0.
(i) Fix any x ∈ R n , ǫ ∈ R >0 , and u ∈ U M,ǫ x [0, t], and denote the corresponding near-optimal trajectory by ξ . = χ(x, u) as per (5) . Applying (44) and Corollary 3.6, note that W
Consequently, returning to the definition (44) of near optimality, and applying (45), Corollary 3.6, and the bound K + φ ′ (0) ≥ 0 adopted in (7) (ii),
That is, with β as per (49),
from which (46) immediately follows by selecting η t . = 1+γ
. The left-hand equality of (47) holds follows by (16) , (27), and assertion (i), i.e. (46). In particular,
It remains to show that the right-hand equality in (47) holds. Fix any u ∈ U ǫ x [0, t]. Suppose there exists δ ∈ R >0 such that µ(∆ t (x, u)) ≥ δ > 0. An analogous calculation to (50), with W M t and Φ M replaced with W t and sup M ≥−φ(0) Φ M , yields
in which the equalities follow as δ ∈ R >0 , and by (18) and Lemma A.2. Hence, W t (x) = ∞, which contradicts the definition of x ∈ dom W t . Consequently, no such δ ∈ R >0 exists, so that µ(∆ t (x, u)) = 0. As u ∈ U ǫ x [0, t] is arbitrary, the right-hand equality in (47) follows as required. (iii) Immediate by assertion (ii) and Theorem 4.3.
Remark 4.7. Theorem 4.6 indicates that the regulator problem defined by W t of (1) implements the required state constraint for almost every time for those initial states x ∈ R n for which W t (x) < ∞, and that the approximating regulator problem defined by W M t of (21) implements the same constraint in the limit as M → ∞.
Equivalent unconstrained game representations
The sup-of-quadratics representation (12) for the convex barrier function Φ in (6) is used to demonstrate equivalence of the value function defining the state constrained regulator problem (1) with the upper value of an unconstrained two player game. Similarly, the approximate sup-of-quadratics representation (18) is used to demonstrate an equivalence between the value function defining the approximate regulator problem (21) with the corresponding upper value of an approximate two player game. It is further demonstrated that this approximate game has equivalent upper and lower values, which in turn is used to demonstrate the corresponding equivalence for the exact game, via the convergence results of Theorem 3.7. The lower value is subsequently exploited to examine solutions of the state constrained regulator problem (1) via families of DREs.
Exact unconstrained game and its upper value
Given a horizon t ∈ R ≥0 , define a function space by
Motivated by (2), (3), (12) , define the upper value W t : R n → R + of a two player unconstrained linear quadratic game by
for all x ∈ R n , in which J t is a cost function defined with respect to a new integrated running cost function I t motivated by (3), and the existing integrated running cost I κ t of (3) and terminal cost Ψ of (4). In particular, define J t , I t :
for all x ∈ R n , u ∈ U [0, t], α ∈ A [0, t],α ∈ R ≥−φ(0) . The value functions (1) and (51) defining the exact regulator problem and the exact unconstrained game are in fact equivalent, as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1. Given t ∈ R ≥0 , the value functions W t , W t of (1), (51) are equivalent, with W t (x) = W t (x) for all x ∈ R n .
The proof of Theorem 5.1 follows as a consequence of a measurable selection lemma.
(i) The cost functionsĪ t , I t of (3), (53) associated with the exact regulator problem (1) and game upper value (51) satisfȳ
in which ν is as per (54);
(iii) If x ∈ dom W t and u ∈ U ǫ x [0, t], ǫ ∈ R >0 , see (43), then (57) holds with α * ∈ A [0, t] as per (56), for arbitrary M ∈ R ≥−φ(0) .
The left-hand equality in (55) is immediate by (3), (53), (54), and Theorem 3.2, in particular (12) . For the right-hand equality, first fix any α ∈ A [0, t], and note that it is pointwise suboptimal in the supremum overα ≥ −φ(0). That is,
In order to prove the opposite inequality, fix δ ∈ R >0 , and suppose that u ∈ U [0, t] is such that
for all s ∈ [0, t]. Note thatα is suboptimal insofar as
As this is true for any α + ∈ R ≥−φ(0) , it follows immediately that
Lemma A.2 implies that ν(ξ s , ·) = γ |ξs| 2 (·) is strictly increasing for any s ∈ ∆ t (x, u) fixed, as |ξ s | 2 ≥ b 2 by (45), with lim
Consequently, there exists an 
As the left-hand side here is the right-hand side of (58), it follows immediately that the opposite inequality to (58) always holds where |∆ t (x, u)| ≥ δ > 0. Alternatively, suppose u ∈ U [0, t] is such that µ(∆ t (x, u)) = 0, and let α * ∈ A [0, t] be defined by (56). Recalling the left-hand equality of (55), and the definition (13) ofα * (·) in Theorem 3.2,
Combining this inequality with (58) yields (55).
(ii) Immediate by the fourth equality of (59). (1)- (3) and (51)-(54).
Approximate game and its upper and lower values
. Analogous to the exact game defined by (51), define the upper value W M t : R n → R of an approximating two player unconstrained linear quadratic game by
for all x ∈ R n , where cost J t is as per (52). As in the exact case, the value function (21) of the approximating regulator problem and the upper value (60) of the approximating game are equivalent.
The proof of Theorem 5.3 follows as a consequence of a corresponding measurable selection lemma.
, and ξ . = χ(x, u) ∈ C([0, t]; R n ), the cost functionsĪ M t , I t and J M t , J t of (23), (53) and (22), (52) satisfȳ
in which α M * ∈ A M [0, t] is defined via (19) by, and satisfies,
Fix any ǫ ∈ R >0 with ǫ 2 < min(1,ρ(M )), andρ(M ) as per (15) .
for all s ∈ [0, t], with χ,α M * as per (5), (19) . Recalling (5) and Lemma 2.1, note in particular that
so that, by subtraction,
As u M * is the minimizer ofJ M t (x, ·), see Theorem 4.3 and (40), a lower bound for the integral term in the right-hand side of (68) is sought, as a function of δ, using Taylor's theorem. To this end, it may be shown with some calculation via (19) , (54), (66), (99) that
in which the derivatives follow by Lemma A.2 and the identity ν(
, with γ (·) as per (99). Observe that the second partial derivative in (69) is unbounded if |ξ M * s | → 0. Two cases are thus considered, (i) s ∈ ∆ ǫ 0 , and
Hence, (54), the triangle inequality, Taylor's theorem, and (67) together imply that the integrand in (68) satisfies
By inspection of (52), (53), (54), W α t of (79) defines the value of an LQR problem, parameterized by α ∈ A M [0, t]. In order to demonstrate that W α t has an explicit quadratic representation, it is convenient to consider the final value problem (FVP)
for all s ∈ [0, t], in whichÂ,P t ,V s ∈ R (n+1)×(n+1) , s ∈ [0, t],B ∈ R (n+1)×m ,Ĉ ∈ R n×(n+1) are defined in terms of κ, K of (2), A, B of (5), and P t of (4) bŷ
in which I n ∈ R n×n and 0 n ∈ R n×1 denote the identity matrix and zero vector respectively. Solutions to FVP (80), where they exist, take the compatibly partitioned form
for all s ∈ [0, t].
Remark 5.11. FVP (80) may be equivalently expressed as three component FVPs
in which the respective boundary data follows by (4), (81).
Lemma 5.12. Given fixed t ∈ R >0 , M ∈ R ≥−φ(0) , and any α ∈ A M [0, t], there exists a uniquê 
is the unique solution of FVP (80). Furthermore, the optimal input u α ∈ U [0, t] in (79) has the state feedback characterizatioṅ
for any x ∈ R n , where P α s , Q α s are as per (83), (84).
Proof. Fix arbitrary t ∈ R >0 , M ∈ R ≥−φ(0) , and α ∈ A M [0, t]. Applying Lemma 5.12, there exists a uniqueP α ∈ C([0, t]; Σ n+1 ) ∩ C 1 ((0, t); Σ n+1 ) of the form (82) that satisfies FVP (80). Consequently, given any s ∈ (0, t), x ∈ R n , (80), (82), (83), (84), (85) imply that
Define the Hamiltonian
for all x, p ∈ R n , s ∈ [0, t]. Combining (87), (88), note that − (5), and observe via (88) thatū s is pointwise suboptimal in
Integrating with respect to s ∈ [0, t], and observing thatW α t (t, x) = Ψ(x), yields
Asū ∈ U [0, t] is arbitrary, it follows by (79) that
for all x ∈ R n . Consider the initial value problem (86). By Lemma 5.12, note that
Hence, repeating the above argument and applying (79), (89),
Recalling that x ∈ R n is arbitrary completes the proof.
Theorem 5.14. Given any t ∈ R >0 , M ∈ R ≥−φ(0) , suppose there exists a unique solution
of the two point boundary value problem (TPBVP)
for all s ∈ (0, t), where P t , z are as per (4) . Then, the optimal inputs (77) are given by the state feedback characterizations
for all s ∈ [0, t], in whichα M * is as per (19) , (63).
Proof. Fix t ∈ R >0 , M ∈ R ≥−φ(0) , and suppose that a unique solution of TPBVP (90) 
, in which P α , Q α , ξ α are as per (86). Note by inspection that P α , Q α satisfy the FVPs defined by (83), (84), which are precisely the FVPs defined by the first two equations of (90). By assertion, these FVPs exhibit a unique solution given by P * , Q * , so that P α ≡ P * , Q α ≡ Q * . Consequently, (86) and (91) imply that
simple example is considered. The linear dynamics (5) and barrier (6) are specified by
while the running cost (3) and its approximation (23) are specified by t . = 4, κ . = 1, K . = 0.1, and M . = 50. The sup-of-quadratics representation for Φ M provided by Theorem 3.5 is illustrated in Figure 1a . The trajectory defined by TPBVP (90) is computed using a standard shooting method, which integrates the state dynamics (5) and FVP (80) backward in time from the known terminal cost P * t = P t ∈ Σ 3 , and a candidate terminal state ξ * t = ξ t ∈ R 2 . The error in the obtained initial state |x − ξ * 0 | is subsequently iteratively minimized by varying ξ t using a Nelder-Mead simplex method. Case I: Terminal cost (4) with z . = 0 and P t . = I 2 . A pair of optimal trajectories for this terminal cost case is illustrated in Figure 2a , corresponding to the barrier cost being active or inactive, i.e. included or excluded, in the cost (2), (23). The circle included identifies the boundary of the state constraint imposed. An initial state of x . = [ 1.6 −1.6 ] ′ for dynamics (5) is assumed. Figures 3a and 4a illustrate the optimal inputsα * andũ * of (91) respectively. By inspection of the unconstrained case,α * attains its maximum value of M = 50 where the constraint is violated. However, asα * does not influence the control in the unconstrained case, the trajectory is not adjusted accordingly. In contrast, in the active constraint case,α * attains a maximum of approximately 35 as the trajectory approaches the constraint. By inspection, the state constraint is not violated, due to the intervention evident in the large actuated controlũ * that ensues.
Case II: Terminal cost (4) with z . = [ 1 1 ] ′ and P t . = 10 I 2 . The terminal cost is adjusted in this case so as to encourage the trajectory to move towards the non-zero terminal state ξ t = z = [ 1 1 ] ′ , while respecting the state constraint. Figures 2b, 3b , and 4b illustrate respectively the corresponding state trajectories, the optimal inputα * , and the optimal controlũ * obtained, by solving TPBVP (90), with the constraint inactive and active.
Note that in both cases, the log barrier function φ of the form specified in (93) yields
in which W −1 is the −1 branch of the Lambert-W function. In practice, it was found that evaluating the inverses numerically was sufficiently accurate and fast, e.g. solving α = a(β) for β given α.
Conclusions
A sup-of-quadratics representation is developed for a class of convex barrier functions of interest in implementing state constraints in linear regulator problems. Using this representation, an equivalent unconstrained two player linear quadratic game is constructed. By demonstrating equivalence of its upper and lower values, an approach to computation is presented, and illustrated by example. A Some useful properties of the barrier and its dual Lemma A.1. Given φ satisfying (7), the function a of (8) is well-defined, differentiable, and strictly increasing, and has a well-defined, differentiable, and strictly increasing first derivative a ′ and inverse a −1 , and a well-defined, strictly positive second derivative a ′′ , satisfying
Proof. By inspection of (8), and the properties of (φ ′ ) −1 provided by (7) (v), it is evident that a is well-defined on
, in which the denominator is strictly positive by (7) (i), (v). Hence, a is differentiable by inspection of (8), and the chain rule yields
is well-defined and strictly increasing, with a ′ :
That is, (94) holds. As a ′ (φ ′ (0)) = 0 (by substitution), the strict increase property of a ′ implies that a ′ (β) ∈ R >0 for all β ∈ (φ ′ (0), ∞). Hence, a is also strictly increasing, and so (8) implies that a(β) ≥ a(φ ′ (0)) = −φ(0) for all β ∈ [φ ′ (0), ∞). By the same strict increase property of a ′ , note further that there exists an ǫ > 0 and
, which confirms the range of a specified in (8) .
By inspection of (94) and (7) (i), a ′ is differentiable with derivative a ′′ given by
, which (as indicated previously) is strictly positive by (7) (i), (v). Hence, (95) holds.
As a is strictly increasing, the existence of its strictly increasing inverse a −1 , with domain and range specified by (96), follows immediately from (8) . The chain rule and (94) subsequently imply that a −1 is also differentiable, with derivative (97). There, the range of this derivative follows by (7) (v), (94). The two limits in (98) follow directly from (97), with
These limits, along with the fact that (a −1 ) ′ is decreasing, confirm the range in (97).
Lemma A.2. Given ρ ∈ R ≥0 , and a −1 as per (96), the map γ ρ : R ≥−φ(0) → R defined by
is twice differentiable with derivatives γ ′ ρ :
withρ as per (15) . If ρ ∈ R ≥b 2 , then α → γ ρ (α) is strictly increasing with lim α→∞ γ ρ (α) = +∞.
in which a, a −1 ,ρ(M ) are given by (8) , (96), (15) , and λ M + : R → R is defined by (15), (94), where λ M + is as per (105). Hence, inequality (102) is a special case of inequality (103).
[Inequality (103)] There are two cases to consider, namely,
. By inspection of the definition of λ M + and (15), (96),
so that (103) holds.
. Recall the derivative of a −1 from (97), and similarly differentiateρ via (15) 
. Note that neither derivative is defined at α = −φ(0), as a ′ • a −1 (−φ(0)) = 0. Hence, by inspection of its definition above, µ is differentiable on R >−φ(0) , with the product rule yielding Hence, recalling that a is strictly increasing, the right-hand side of (104) for (6) is closed and convex on R by (6), (7), [15, (3.8) , pp. 15, 17] . Hence, there exists a one-to-one pairing between Φ and its Fenchel transform Θ = Φ * , as indicated by (10) , see [15, Theorem 5, p.16] . The objectives are to establish the explicit form (10) of the function Θ, its range, and the optimizers (11) attending the suprema in (10) . To this end, note by inspection of (6) and the definition of Θ in (10) that Θ(β) = sup
for all β ∈ R, ρ ∈ [0, b 2 ). If β ∈ R ≥φ ′ (0) , the supremum is attained at ρ = ρ * = (φ ′ ) −1 (β), as 0 = π ′ β (ρ * ) = β − φ ′ (ρ * ). Note by (7) (v) that ρ * ∈ [0, b 2 ). The supremum is then π β (ρ * ) = β (φ ′ ) −1 (β) − φ • (φ ′ ) −1 (β) . = a(β), as per (8) . Alternatively, if β ∈ R <φ ′ (0) , (7) (iv) implies that π ′ β (ρ) = β − φ ′ (ρ) < φ ′ (0) − φ ′ (ρ) ≤ 0 for ρ ∈ [0, b 2 ). Hence, the supremum must be achieved at ρ * = 0, and π β (ρ * ) = −φ(0). Combining both of the above cases immediately yields the right-hand equations in (10) and (11) .
In order to demonstrate that the left-hand equality in (11), holds, note by (10) that Φ(ρ) = max{Γ − (ρ), Γ + (ρ)},
Γ − (ρ) . = sup β<φ ′ (0) {β ρ + φ(0)} = +∞, ρ ∈ R <0 , φ(0) + φ ′ (0) ρ, ρ ∈ R ≥0 ,
for all β, ρ ∈ R. The supremum in (109) is achieved at
In considering Γ + of (110), recall that a of (8) is differentiable by Lemma A.1, with derivative given by (94). Three cases are subsequently considered, (i) ρ ∈ [0, b 2 ), (ii) ρ ∈ R <0 , and (iii) ρ ∈ R ≥b 2 .
(i) ρ ∈ [0, b 2 ): As a ′ (β) = (φ ′ ) −1 (β) is well-defined for all β ∈ R ≥φ ′ (0) , see (94), χ ρ is differentiable with χ ′ ρ (β) = ρ − (φ ′ ) −1 (β) for all β ∈ R ≥φ ′ (0) . Substituting β = β * . = φ ′ (ρ) ∈ R ≥φ ′ (0) yields χ ′ ρ (β * ) = ρ − (φ ′ ) −1 (β * ) = 0. Hence, the supremum in (110) is attained at β = β * , with χ ρ (β * ) = ρ φ ′ (ρ) − a • φ ′ (ρ) = ρ φ ′ (ρ) − [φ ′ (ρ) ρ − φ(ρ)] = φ(ρ). (ii) ρ ∈ R <0 : As a ′ has a nonnegative range, see (94), χ ′ ρ (β) = ρ − a ′ (β) < −a ′ (β) ≤ 0 for all β ∈ R ≥φ ′ (0) . Hence, the supremum in (110) is achieved at β * = φ ′ (0), and χ ρ (β * ) = φ ′ (0) ρ − [0 − φ(0)] = φ(0) + φ ′ (0) ρ. (iii) ρ ∈ R ≥b 2 : Observe that χ ρ (β) = γ ρ • a(β) for all β ∈ R ≥φ ′ (0) , in which γ ρ is defined in (99). As a : R ≥φ ′ (0) → R ≥−φ(0) is strictly increasing and has an unbounded range, Lemma A.2 implies that lim β→∞ χ ρ (β) = lim β→∞ γ ρ • a(β) = ∞. Hence, the supremum in (110) is achieved at β * = ∞, and χ ρ (β * ) = ∞.
Combining cases (i) -(iii), Γ + of (110) may be written explicitly as
with the supremum achieved at the β * =β * + (ρ) specified. Combining (108) with (109), (112), and the fact that φ(ρ) ≥ φ(0) + φ ′ (0) ρ for all ρ ∈ [0, b 2 ) by (7) (i), yields (6) . Similarly, combining (111) and (112) yields the left-hand equation in (11) . 
